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[.L. A. No. 26695. In Bank. May S, 1962.] 
ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. IN-
DUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and FRED 
MONTANA, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Aggrava-
tion of Preexisting Disease.-Whether a disability of an em-
ployee results in whole or in part from the normal progress 
of a preexisting disease or represents a fully compensable 
lighting up or aggravation of a preexisting condition is a 
question for the Industrial Accident COlllmission to deter-
mine, and its award will not be annulled if there is substantial 
evidence to support it. 
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Aggravation of Preexisting Dis-
ease or Condition.-Where an employee who injured his back 
lifting a heavy steel blade onto a truck testified that he had 
never had back trouble before the injury nnd several doctor~, 
who agreed that before the injury the employee hnd an un-
stable lumbosacral spine with SOUle arthritis, described hi:> 
former condition as "asymptomatic," the Industrial Accident 
Commission could reasonably conclude that the preexisting 
condition did not call for apportionment of the disability 
under Lab. Code, § 4663. 
[3] Id.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of 
Average Earnings.-The purpose of Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. 
(d), relating to computation of average weekly earnings for 
disability indemnity, is to equalize for compensation purpose:> 
the position of the full-time, regularly employed worker 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 101; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 247. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 161 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 113; 
[3-9, 11] Workmen's Compensation, § 224; [10] Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 272(8). 
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whose earning capacity is merely a multiple of his daily wage 
and that of the worker whose wage at the time of injury may 
be aberrant or otherwise a distorted basis for estimating true 
earning power. 
[4] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of 
Earnings.-It would not be consistent with the purpose of Lab. 
Code, § 4453, subd. (d), rela ting to compu tation of average 
weekly earnings for disability indemnity, to foreclose a worker 
from a maximum temporary or permanent award simply 
because a brief recession had forced him to work sporadically 
or at a low wage. Nor in making a permanent disability 
award would it be consistent with the purpose of the statute 
to base a finding of maximum earning capacity solely on a 
high wage, ignoring irregular employment and low income 
over a long pex:i0d of time. 
[5] ld.-Compensation and Bene5.ts Recoverable-Computation of 
Earnings.-An estimate of an injUl·ed employee's earning 
capacity is a prediction of what the employee's earnings would 
have been had he not been injured. In the case of a tempo-
rary award, the prediction of earnings need only be made for 
the duration of the temporary disability. In the case of a 
permanent award, the prediction is more complex because the 
compensation is for loss of earning power over a long span of 
time; the applicant's earning capacity could be maximum for 
a temporary award and minimmn for a permanent award or 
the reverse. 
[6] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of 
Earnings.-Evidence sufficient to sustain a maximum tempo-
rary award for a disabled employee might not sustain a maxi-
mmn permanent award. In making an award for temporary 
disability, the Industrial Accident Commission will ordinarily 
be concerned with whether an applicant would have continued 
working at a given wage for the duration of the disability; in 
making a permanent award, long-term earning history is a 
reliable guide in predicting earning capacity, although in a 
variety of fact situations earning history alone may be mia-
leading. 
r7] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of 
Earnings.-With regard to both temporary and permanent 
awards to a disabled employee, all facts relevant and helpful 
to make the estimate of earning capacity must be considereJ. 
The applicant's ability to work, his willingness and oppor-
tunities to work, his skill and education, the general condi-
tion of the labor market, and employment opportunities for 
persons similarly situated arc all relevant. In weighing such 
facts, the Industrial Accident Commission may make use of 
its general knowledge as a basis of reasonable forecast. 
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[8] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation of 
Earnings.-In weighing the evidence relevant to earning capac-
ity of a disabled employee, the Industrial Accident Commission 
has the same range of di scretion that it has in apportioning 
injuries between industrial and nonindustrial causes. It must, 
however, ha,e evidence that will at least demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the determination made. 
[9a,9b] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computa-
tion of Earnings.-An Industrial Accident Commission award 
assuming maximum earning capacity, notwithstanding the 
referee's findings that the applicant's earning capacity was less 
than the minimum for compensation purposes, and based on 
the commission's statement that he was a permanent employee 
working irregularly over a five-year period due to business 
conditions, should be annulled and the cause remanded for 
further proceedings where the commission did not specify 
the nature of the business conditions referred to and where, 
had it given "duc consideration to actual earnings from all 
sources of employments" (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. (d» and 
heard evidence tending to show thRt the applicant's lean years 
were unusual for him and that men with similar skills, ages, 
physical characteristics and earning histories were becoming 
steadily employed, it could properly have discounted the ap-
plicant's earning history. 
[10] ld. - Review - Findings. - Findings that an applicant for 
workmen's compensation was a "permanent employee" and that 
his sporadic employment was caused by "business conditions" 
are ambiguous. If meant to distinguish the case of a person 
who is a constant competitor on the labor market from one 
who by choice enters and leaves that market periodically, 
tbe finding that the applicant was a "permanent employee" is 
essentially no more than a finding of his willingness to work. 
[11] ld.-Compensation and Benefits Recoverable-Computation 
of Earnings.-Willingness to work can be meaningful in pre-
dicting what an applicant's earnings would have been only if 
considered in the light of his employment opportunities. If the 
business conditions causing temporary low earnings are no 
more than a short recession, the earnings will most likely not 
represent earning capacity for purposes of a permanent award. 
Long-run business conditions, however, necessarily have a 
bearing on ability to earn. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding temporary and permanent dis· 
ability compensation for personal injuries. Award of tem-
porary compensation affirmed; award of permanent compen-
sation annulled and cause remanded with directions. 
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H erlihy & H erlihy, Robert R. Smith and Ray B. Cumming 
for P etitioner. 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Thcotlore P. Nieder-
miller, Edmund D . Leonard, Clair \V. MacLeod, Lewellyn T. 
McMahon, L . Richard Bloomer, Charles A. Rummel, E isner & 
Titchell, Norman A . Eisner, Hanna & Brophy and Warren L . 
Hanna as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
Ever ett A. Corten, Edward A. Sarkisian, Richman, Garrett 
& Ansell and Lewis Garrett for Respondents. 
Charles P . Scully and Lowell A . Airola as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of R espondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-On June 20, 1960, Fred Montana injured 
his back lifting a heavy steel blade onto a truck. A coworker 
holding one end of the blade dropped it without warning, and 
Montana, suddenly holding almost the entire load, "felt some-
thing tight in ... lhis back] ." The injury, an acute lumbo-
sacral strain, resulted in temporary total disability and partial 
permanent disability. Petitioner paid Montana temporary 
compensation of $928.57 at the rate of $65 a week before the 
Industrial Accident Commission made its award. The referee 
determined that 75 per cent of the disability should be appor-
tioned to a preexisting back condition, that Montana 's earning 
capacity was less than minimum for compensation purposes, 
and that the award should therefore be based on average 
weekly earnings of $20 a week. Computed at this rate, Mon-
tana would be entitled to $285.72 as temporary compensation 
and $440 for permanent disability. Under this computation 
the insurance carrier had overpaid Montana $243.57. The 
commission held, however, that the evidence did not require 
apportionment of the disability under Labor Code section 4663 
and that Montana's "earning capacity was maximum under 
Section 4453 (d) of the Labor Code." Accordingly, the com-
mission awarded him $4,620 as permanent indemnity and 
approved the t emporary compensation paid. 
Montana testified that he had never had back trouble before 
the injury. No evidence contradicted this testimony, and 
several doctors described his former condition as "asympto-
matic ." Ne.vertheless, the medical experts agreed that even 
before the injury he had an unstable lumbosacral spine with 
some arthritis and that he should not have been lifting heavy 
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objects. When asked what advice he would have given Mon-
tana before the accident, the independent medical examiner 
testified: "I don't know-I couldn't tell him not to lift, 
because I know he would. We look at a number of things. 
I would not advise him to give up his work, if this is all he 
knows how to do, because some of th cse guys do get by indefi-
nitely." (Italics added.) Describing Montana's prcaceident 
condition, he stated: "There was some increase in the lumbo-
sacral angle with mild scoliosis. His pelvis was tipped for-
ward. He had some degenerative changes which were not 
marked. I mean, there was nothing unusual about the x-rays 
for a man of this build ... and age. They are not too far 
away from normal, about what you w01tld expect with his 
build and age." (Italics added.) Another doctor stated in 
his report: "There is no evidence of pre-existing symptomatic 
bone or joint disease and no history of previous low back 
injury or disability. The osteoarthritic changes visualized are 
no more in evidence in the area of symptoms than they are 
in other areas of his spine. At most they delayed his func-
tional recovery." 
[1] Whether a disability results in whole or in part from 
"the normal progress of a preexisting disease" (Industrial 
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 95 Cal.App.2d 443, 450 
[213 P.2d 11]) or represents a fully compensable lighting 
up or aggravation of a preexisting condition is a question 
for the commission to determine, and its award will not be 
annulled if there is substantial evidence to support it. 
(Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 29 Cal.2d 79,83-84 
[172 P.2d 884] ; Tanenbaum v. Industrial Acc. Com., 4 Ca1.2d 
615, 617 [52 P.2d 215].) [2] In view of the foregoing 
testimony, the commission could reasonably conclude that the 
preexisting condition did not call for apportionment. (See 
Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Cal. 
App.2d 567 [232 P.2d 11].) 
The more difficult question is whether the commission cor-
rectly determined Montana's earning capacity under subdivi-
sion (d) of section 4453 of the Labor Code1 in computing 
'The statute read at the time the award was made: 
"In computing average annual earnings for purposes of temporary 
disability indemnity only, the average weekly earnings shall be taken 
at not less than thirty dollars and seventy-se~en cents ($30.77) nor more 
than one hundred dollars (tlOO). In computing average annual earnings 
for purposes of permanent disability indemnity. the average weekly 
earnings shall be taken at not less than thirty dollars and seventy-seven 
cents (t30.77) nor more than eighty dollars and seventy-seven cents 
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temporary and permanent disability compensation. Othcr 
suUdivisions of that section (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. (a), 
(b), (c)) set forth formulae for computing average weekly 
earnings that in turn are made the basis for the two types of 
award. (Lab. Code, §§ 4653-4655; 4658-4662.) [3] When 
an employee is steadily cmployed at a full-time job his earn-
ing capacity is determined by an appropriate formula (see 
W est V. Industrial Ace. Com., 79 Cal.App.2d 711, 722 [180 
P.2d 972] ). When the employment is for less than 30 hours a 
,reek or when a formula "cannot reasonably and fairly be 
applied" the commission must make its own estimate of 
weekly earning capacity at the time of the injury. (Lab. 
Code, § 4453, subd. (d).) The purpose of this provision is 
to equalize for compensation purposes the position of the 
full-time, regularly employed worker whose earning capacity 
is merely a multiple of his daily wage and that of the worker 
whose wage at the time of injury may be aberrant or other-
wise a distorted basis for estimating true earning power. 
[4] It would hardly be consistent with that purpose to 
foreclose a worker from a maximum temporary or permanent 
award simply because a brief recession had forced him to work 
sporadically or at a low wage. Nor in making a permanent 
disability award would it be consistent with the purpose of 
the statute to base a finding of maximum earning capacity 
solely on a high wage, ignoring irregular employment and 
low income over a long period of time. 
[5] An estimate of earning capacity is a prediction of 
what an employee's earnings would have been had he not 
been injured. Earning capacity, for the purposes of a tempo-
rary award, however, may differ from earning capacity for 
the purposes of a permanent award. In the fonner case the 
prediction of earnings need only be made for the duration 
of the temporary disability. In the latter the prediction is 
more complex because the compensation is for loss of earning 
power over a long span of time. Thus an applicant's earning 
capacity could be maximum for a temporary R\nrd and mini-
($80.77). Between these limits the average weekly earnings .. • shall 
be arri\"ed at as follows: 
" [ ] 
" ( d) Where the employment is for less than 30 hours per week, or 
where for any reason the foregoing methods of nrriving at the nverage 
weekly earnings cnnnot Tcasonnbly and fairly be applied, the average 
"eekly earnings shall be taken nt 95 percent of the Sum which reason· 
ably represents the arerage weekly earning capacity of the injured 
employee at the time of his injury, dlle consideration bein.Q girl'1l to hi8 
actual earnings from all sourccs and employments." (Italics added.) 
) 
:May 1:; (;..:: j ArUJON AUT INS. Co. v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. COM. 595 
13. C'.2J :;JJ ; 21 Cal.Rptr. 545, 371 P.2d 281) 
mum fo!' a permancnt award or the rcverse. [6] Evidence 
sufficicnt to sustain a maximum temporary award might not 
sustain a maximum permanent award. In making an award 
for tcmporary disability, the commission will ordinarily be 
concern cd with whether an applicant would have continued 
working at a givcn wage for the duration of the disability. 
In making a permancnt award, long. term earning history is 
a reliable guide in predicting earning capacity, although in 
a variety of fact situations earning history alone may be 
misleading. [7] With regard to both awards all facts rele-
vant and helpful to making the estimate must be considered. 
(Colonial Mut. Camp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 47 Cal. 
App.2d 487, 490·492 [118 P.2d 361] ; Aetna Life 1-ns. Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 130 Cal.App. 488, 491·492 [20 P.2d 
372] ; see Southern B ell Tel. &; Tel. Co. v. Bell (Fla.) 116 
So.2d 617, 620·621; Vanney v. Alaska Packers Assn., 12 
Alaska 284, 290-291 ; Larson, The Law of \Vorkmen's Compen-
sation, § 57.21 at pp. 4-7.) The applicant's ability to work, 
his age and health, his willingness and opportunities to work, 
his skill and education, the general condition of the labor 
market, and employment opportunities fo r persons similarly 
situated are all relevant. (See West v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra at p. 722; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra at pp. 491-492.) In weighing such facts, the commission 
may make use of "'its general knowledge as a basis of 
.reasonable forecast.' " (Latour v. Prod1!Cel's Dairy, Inc., 102 
N.H. 5 [148 A.2d 655, 657] ; compare Russell v. S01~theastern 
Util. Service Co., 230 Miss. 272 [92 So.2d 544, 547J.) [8] In 
weighing the evidence relevant to earning capacity the com-
mission has the same range of discretion that it has in 
apportioning injuries between industrial and nonindustrial 
causes. (See e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
supra at p. 493.) It must, however, "have evidence that will 
at least demonstrate the reasonableness of the determination 
made." (Davis v. Industrial Com. of Arizona, 82 Ariz. 173 
[309 P.2d 793, 795].) 
[9a] Montana was 50 years old when he was injured, 
and he had established a pattern of intermittent work that 
apparently extended over five years. He worked as a laborer, 
usually on construction projects, was generally paid at a high 
hourly rate, and took any employment offered to him through 
his union. He held four jobs during the 15 months preced-
ing his injury. Two of them lasted only three days. During 
the winter of -1959-1960 he worked 15 to 17 days as a brick 
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tender, earning between $104 and $125 a week. At the time of 
his injury, he had been employed for two months on a flood 
control project on which he earned $887 .20. Total earnings 
over the 15-month period amounted to between $1,200 and 
$1,300. 
In measuring earning capacity, the commission must give 
"due consideration to actual earnings from all sources and 
employments." (Lab. Code, § 4453, subd. (d) .) The evi-
dence herein of a long record of irregular employment and 
low earnings would seem, therefore, to require a finding of 
minimum earning capacity in making the permanent award 
unless there were other relevant facts tending to support II 
contrary conclusion. In this regard, the commission stated 
that "the duration of ... [Montana's] work was indefinite," 
and that he was" a permanent employee working irregularly 
due to business conditions." The only sense in which the 
job was indefinite, however, was that no one could say for cer-
tain how many weeks it would last. The fact that Montana 
was hired only for a particular project that was completed 
within three months of the date of his injury indicates that 
the job was contemplated to be of limited duration. [10] The 
findings that he was a "permanent employee" and that hi'> 
sporadic employment was caused by "business conditions" 
are ambiguous. The commission could not mean that Mon-
tana normally held a steady job or that his employment at 
the time of injury was" permanent." It probably meant to 
distinguish the case of a person who is a constant !'ompetitor 
on the labor market from one who by choice enters and leaves 
that market periodically. (See Larson, supra, at §§ 60.20, 
60.21, 60.22, pp. 72-78; compare Campb ell v. Ind1lstn·al Acc. 
Com., 95 Cal.App.2d 570 [213 P.2d 395] and West v. Indus-
trial Acc. Corn ., supra, with O'Hcarne v. Maryland Cas. Co ., 
177 F .2d 979.) In this sense, the finding that Montana was a 
"permanent employee" is essentially no more than a finding 
of his willingness to work. [11] Willingness to work, how-
ever, can be meaningful in predicting what an applicant's 
earnings would have been only if considered in the light of his 
employment opportunities. With r egard to such opportunities 
the commission stated that "business conditions" caused 
Montana's low and unstable earning history. If the business 
conditions causing temporary low earnings are no more than 
a short recession, the earnings will most likely not represent 
earning capacity for purposes of a permanent award. Long-
run business conditions, however, necessarily have a bearing 
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on ability to earn. [9b] The commission did not specify the 
nature of the business conditions referred to. Had it heard 
evidence tending to show that Montana's five lean years were 
unusual for him, that the construction industry in the area 
anticipated a period of prosperity, that men with similar 
skills, ages, physical characteristics, and earning histories 
were becoming steadily employed, it could properly have dis-
counted Montana's earning history. In the absence of such 
evidence, however, the commission failed to give due con-
sideration to actual earnings as required by section 4453. 
The commission had substantial evidence, however, to sup-
port its award for temporary disability. Montana worked 
for two months on the project, which lasted for an additional 
three months following the injury, and he would probably 
have continued thereon had he not been disabled. 
The award of temporary disability compensation is af-
firmed. The award of permanent disability compensation is 
annulled, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J ., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1962. 
